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Rumour and Decertification in Exile Politics: Evidence from the 
Egyptian Case 
Does exile affect activism and if so how? In this paper the case of Egyptian 
activists exiled in England is taken as illustrative of processes typical of exiled 
activism. The case study draws on primary and secondary sources including a 
series of biographical interviews with exiled activists. The analysis compares 
activism in Egypt with exiled activism in England using the participants’ critical 
self-reflections to explain the mechanisms mediating the changes. Contrary to 
reasonable expectations that exile is a spontaneous response to a change in 
political context, the conditions for exile predate banishment and lie within the 
institutions of dictatorship which decertify activism. Decertification continues 
throughout the exile process as fear of repression becomes internalised within the 
movement. Within the sanctuary of the host country a process of brokerage 
counteracts decertification expanding and modifying the exile repertoire. 
Keywords: social movements, exile, rumour, decertification, contentious politics, 
Arab Spring 
Introduction 
Exiled Activism: A New Focus for Social Movement Theory 
Before, during, even after activists’ flight from their home countries, dictatorial regimes 
undermine their participation in contentious politics. This paper addresses one of the 
surprising ways exile continues to deter activism, even from the relative safety of 
sanctuary abroad, yet how exiled activists do manage to assert relevance through 
integration. I designed the research in this paper to provide answers to questions about 
the effects exile has on mobilising structures. Are activists able to turn their exile to the 
advantage of their cause, by exploiting a new structure of opportunities abroad? While 
activists did bring networks and repertoires with them, they needed encouragement and 
assurances from each other and from new allies as their motivation was low and their 



































































Shain (1989) has argued exile means different things to different people because 
it is a political term with no agreed definition in international law. Sociologists view 
exiles as socially deviant while psychologists and legal scholars both view exiles as 
variants of refugees. He continues, a point I concur with, that activism by exiles is 
important enough to warrant a particular definition for political science analyses (Shain, 
2009: 387, 388). I extend Shain’s definition, arguing that from the perspective of 
political science ‘exile’ is a social phenomenon, more specifically a political process, 
best understood through the prism of social movement theory.  
Exile exists at the fringes of political science. It falls outside domestic politics 
but is not quite a matter of international relations (Roemer, 2008: 4). Nonetheless it has 
consequences for both, having been practiced throughout history (Shaw, 2000: 4). It 
was a feature of both ancient Greek (Forsdyke, 2005) and Roman politics (Shaw, 2000). 
‘Exile’ is therefore a modern way to describe an ancient practice. In the 
twentieth century relevant research included psychological studies of the impact the 
isolation of exile has on the psyche and articulations of personal identity (Edinger, 
1956; Kunz, 1973). Sznajder and Roniger accurately describe exile as “a mechanism of 
institutional exclusion – not the only one – by which a person involved in politics and 
public life, or perceived by power holders as such, is forced or pressed to leave his or 
her home country or place of residence, unable to return until a change in political 
circumstances takes place” (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 11). 
They have made this argument in detail elsewhere in a study claiming the rise of 
exile organisations (NGOs and intergovernmental agencies) in the 1970s altered the 
context for transnational activism favourably for activists (Sznajder and Roniger, 2007). 
Shain and Ahran (2003) documented a similar process in the United States where 



































































that focused on private forms of political participation such as lobbying and financial 
flows the subject of this paper is the continuing public political participation of exiles. 
The evidence in this paper is from the case of Egyptians living in England. This 
case is important in its own right but also has important lessons for social movement 
theory. Since 2013 the military in Egypt has retaken control of the state apparatus, 
massacring its main opponent, quelling a popular uprising and instigating a period of 
terror unknown in Egypt since the 1950s (Marfleet, 2016). For most of the period of this 
research Egypt was the country with the second highest number of journalists jailed, but 
has since been surpassed by Turkey (CPJ, 2017). The reintroduction of protest laws has 
made any public gathering, let alone political claim-making, offences carrying a prison 
sentence. Not for the first time in Egyptian history the terrifying practice of 
‘disappearances’ has become a norm. Egyptians moving to England are in this context 
moving from one of the most repressive countries globally to one of the freest. If 
activists can mobilise anywhere surely it is in one of the worlds’ oldest democracies. 
Nonetheless, the little large-n data there is on exile suggests that activists forced abroad 
after a military takeover sit more or less on the line of best fit in the distribution of cases 
(Binningsbø et al, 2012). The case is therefore so extreme, yet so typical on key 
indicators, it is reasonable to think lessons can be drawn for theory and for other 
activists elsewhere (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). 
Using the example of the Egyptian case, I was able to disaggregate the process 
of exile into a number of mechanisms, in this paper I discuss two; decertification1 and 
                                                 
1 Decertification has been defined “as an external authority’s signal that it is withdrawing 
recognition and support from a political actor” (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012: 215). Gentile’s 



































































brokerage.2 The fact of decertification continuing after exile implies a legacy effect of 
an historical path dependency as successive Egyptian governments have sought to 
delegitimise activism. I find evidence of this in the prevalence of rumours and fear, 
internalised within the movement. Brokerage counteracts this in the sense of 
cooperation between exiles and newfound allies enlarging the scope of political 
opportunities. 
In putting this case study together, I assembled sources of evidence which I 
analysed relying on concepts from process tracing and the theoretical framework 
provided by contentious politics. I favoured a qualitative approach to evidencing these 
mechanisms for two reasons. First, I followed advice in the literature about difficulties 
in identifying indicators of mechanisms and the strength of case studies in developing 
observations of mechanisms (Falletti and Lynch, 2008; Staggenborg, 2002). Second, 
life-history inspired approaches are well-suited to studies of exile. This has to do with a 
variety of factors ranging from the personal intimacy of the exile experience to the 
protracted character of the process of exile (Cornejo, 2008; Shahidian, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                               
certification which have prevented European trade unions from coalition building (Gentile, 
2016). 
2 In contentious politics brokerage is commonly understood as the “production of a new 
connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites” (Tarrow and Tilly, 
2012: 215). In historical cases SMOs were the only suitably resourced actors to function as 
brokers, but in the age of social media this role can be taken over by looser knit associations 
or even individuals (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012). Hence, in pre-exile Egyptian activism 
researchers have argued the mechanism brokerage as part of a transnational diffusion 
process, was crucial in increasing the frequency and volume of contention in Egypt in the 



































































The research lasted three years involving four field trips, three in London, one in 
Manchester as well as video conference style interviews with Egyptians living in 
London, Cambridge, Birmingham, Exeter, Manchester and Liverpool. In all I 
interviewed twenty-two Egyptians resident in England, plus six allies and observers of 
the London Egyptian activism scene. I used the interviews to understand the 
participants’ critical self-interpretations of why they did or did not participate in 
activism. In seeking to understand how exile affected activism it was necessary to 
examine the history of exiled activism, and the level of detail that required exceeded the 
memory of even the most observant eye-witness. The descriptive parts of the case study 
are therefore also based on documentary sources of various types. Using the Nexus 
database I corroborated as many of these events as possible based on reports in national 
UK newspapers, regional English newspapers and local London newspapers. A further 
source was the activist organisations (SMOs) themselves. SMOs produce literature that 
is of interest and in the age of social media inadvertently create a record of their 
activities through public event invitations. 
The paper begins with a fresh account of the history of Egyptian activism in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, reinterpreted in light of modern theories of 
contentious politics. This account is brief, sufficient to contrast with the rest of the 
paper which contains an account of exiled activism in England, mostly in London. I 
consider the ‘exile movement’ in terms of its organisation and its actions. I argue that 
both in terms of recruitment and participation decertification continues to act as a 
deterrent as activists fear the reach of the military regime through the London embassy. 
The paper concludes with a comparison of the conditions and mechanisms of activism 
before and after exile in which I try to suggest the ways that the experience of Egyptians 



































































Historical Roots of Decertification 
The root causes of contemporary Egyptian exile are to be found not in the recent coup 
d’etat, but in another one, more than half a century earlier. Nasser’s coup in 1952 closed 
off political opportunities for activists and initiated the process of decertification that 
pushed activists seeking to create their own opportunities to the margins, to the ultimate 
extent of exile in the modern era.3 Following the Free Officer’s (FO) coup the first 
social group to voice their political claims were textile workers in the industrial town 
Kafr Al-Dawr. Their protest was an industrial dispute with their private sector 
employers over pay and conditions that was not necessarily a matter of contentious 
politics.4 However, the workers shrewdly took advantage of political instability caused 
by the FO coup to frame their claims as politically motivated. Although their 
                                                 
3 Context for this argument comes in an extended quote from Marfleet (2016). Marfleet presents 
evidence masterfully demonstrating the ideology underpinning decertification was brought 
to Egypt by British colonisers. He goes on to argue this was opportunistically appropriated 
later by secular Egyptian autocrats (Marfleet, 2016: 21-23).  
“In Egypt, occupied by British forces in 1882, the colonial administration combined 
suspicion of the mass of people with a conviction that they lacked capacities to modify 
both their material circumstances and their subordinate political status. According to 
the British administrator Alfred (later Viscount) Milner, the people of Egypt were 
‘docile and good tempered’; they were ‘a nation of submissive slaves, not only bereft 
of any vestige of liberal institutions but devoid of any spark of the spirit of liberty; 
(Milner, 2002 [1892]: 178). At the same time they were ‘in the grip of a religion the 
most intolerant and fanatical’ (Milner, 2002 [1892]:2). Egyptians required European 
rule and reform: British military occupation, Milner suggested, had succeeded in 
bringing a ‘revolution’ to their lives in the form of new institutions of administration 
and justice (Milner, 2002 [1982]: 5).” (Marleet, 2016: 18). 



































































declarations of loyalty to the new regime may have helped convince management (well 
known supporters of the monarchy that was replaced by the FO) to make concessions 
the response of the state made the new regime’s approach to activism clear. Five-
hundred and forty-nine strikers were arrested with three leaders sentenced to death (one 
received a reduced life sentence). This event established the precedent for activism in 
the first two terms of indigenous Egyptian dictatorship (Abdalla, 1985; Erlich, 1989; 
Vatikiotis, 1978; Vatikiotis, 1980). 
The years from 1968 until 1976 were years of student radicalism.5 In particular 
the episodes of 1968 and 1972 have become known in the popular history of student 
activism as years of ‘uprising’. This phase of activism was also initiated by perceptions 
of political instability when workers marched in protest against defeat in the six-day war 
between Israel and the Arab nations. In 1968 following workers’ protests at Helwan 
students at Cairo University formed a twelve-man committee to coordinate and organise 
protests in solidarity with marching workers. This committee organised contentious 
performances including marches, sit-ins and static demonstrations. Members of the 
committee were allowed into the parliament to put their demands to Sadat who at the 
time was speaker of the house; they were later arrested. The committee also managed to 
coordinate, by telephone, simultaneous student marches in Cairo and Alexandria. 
                                                 
5 The historical record of activism contains a gap between 1954 and 1968. “In the following 
days students passed beyond the university gates and made their presence felt on the streets 
of Cairo and Alexandria for the first time since 1954." (Abdalla, 1985: 149,150). “The 
student riots and workers' demonstrations of February 1968, however, came as an 
unexpected blow to Nasser's recovery from the 1967 debacle. In magnitude and ferocity they 



































































The dearth of activism during the first two terms of indigenous dictatorship is in 
part explained by repression, but also due to the replacement of political parties with 
unique, pro-regime mass-parties designed to redirect political claim-making6 (Abdalla, 
1985: 127; Binder, 1969: 401; Wickham, 2002: 29). That this was successful in 
commencing the process of decertification in this period is evident in the re-emergence 
of more explicitly political protest in Mubarak’s era, with the reestablishment of a 
(flawed) multi-party system.7 When, in 2003, America invaded Iraq, protesters gathered 
in Cairo’s Tahrir Square (Sachs, 2003). The protests were not overtly subversive as their 
demands were anti-American, not anti-Mubarak. Yet they met with repression and 
dispersal, a job the police were ruthless in carrying out. Through criticism of American 
foreign policy Egyptian protesters were criticising their own allied government by 
association. 
Following the anti-war demonstrations Tahrir Square became a regular venue 
for protest (Interview 1, 4). The Egyptian public became accustomed to two relatively 
novel aspects of political expression and one well known aspect: public claim-making, 
organised protest and repression. The first to organise were ‘Kefaya!’: a group of pro-
democracy activists whose name in Arabic means ‘Enough!’. Kefaya were primarily 
protesting censorship under the regime and merely asserted their claimed right to protest 
(Interview 6). Their more ambitious long-term aim, however, was to prevent a Mubarak 
                                                 
6 “[T]hey [the FO] were not opposed to parties as such, only to their corrupt leaders. Thus the 
Liberation Rally was designed not as a party, but as an instrument for the reorganisation of 
popular forces.” Nasser quoted in (Vatikiotis, 1978: 134). 
7 The exception to this trend towards politicisation being protests surrounding the Danish 




































































family succession and ensure the presidency did not fall to Hosni’s son Gamal 
(Marfleet, 2016, 49). Their first protest was small. Protesters gathered in Tahrir square 
for a silent protest wearing yellow stickers on their mouth to symbolise the regime’s 
censorship (El-Mahdi, 2009: 89; Khalil, 2012: 62). The protest was repressed (Naguib, 
2011: 9; Oweidat et al, 2008: 11). 
Yet Kefaya continued agitation and from time to time staged protests (GNAD, 
2005). Their method was innovative for the period as they organised entirely online. 
The absence of a physical headquarters in their earliest days seems to have guarded 
against surveillance by a regime caught by surprise. Even after the activists disbanded 
the group left a legacy on Egyptian activism in various blogs which served as an 
alternative press in the days before a regime to could dismiss citizen journalism as ‘fake 
news’ (Lim, 2012; 235-238). 
A new group of activists led by Ahmed Maher tried to broaden the base of 
protest by calling a general strike on the 6th of April 2008. The strike led to two days of 
violent clashes between riot police and workers at Egypt’s largest textile factory at the 
Nile delta (Khalil, 2012: 72,73). The group took the date April 6th as their name. The 
strike was intended to extend opposition to include both the youth and the industrial 
working class (Interview 1; Marfleet, 2016: 50). The movement was successful in this 
regard. In discussions exiles in England have stressed the ongoing motivational effects 
of the solidarity achieved between social classes during the April 6 campaign 
(Interviews 1, 5, 6, 7). Observers such as Naguib and Marfleet (2016, 50) have argued 
the networks developed between activists and trade unions during this campaign 




































































Summary: The Transformation of Activism in Egypt 
As political opportunities in Egypt were monopolised by the regime, activism 
underwent a process of decertification. The historical record shows that not only was 
activism discouraged it was also physically contained. Whereas when Nasser took 
power in the 1950s contention had been geographically dispersed, with the industrial 
periphery at least as active as the centres of political and executive power in Cairo and 
Alexandria. This containment of activism is further evident in the Egyptian activism 
repertoire. At the beginning of the period surveyed protesters marched as they made 
their claims. Then, by the modern period when basically all activism had migrated to 
Cairo, the ‘occupation’ style protest came to dominate, almost as if the protests had 
come to a standstill. Today, even outside of Egypt, ‘Tahrir’ is often taken as a symbol of 
liberation and rebellion. Viewed through this historical lens it seems just as reasonable 
to think of it not as a liberated space but as one where activists are cornered. 
Decertification: The Effects of Rumours within the Movement 
Decertification continues to operate even after the act of exile, prohibiting new 
mobilisations from abroad. In particular, decertification at this micro-sociological level 
manifests itself in the spread of rumours within activist circles, or mobilising 
structures.8 As rumours are endogenous (to the mobilising structures) this suggests that 
                                                 
8 The observation this section discusses was made in the field and did change my research plan 
significantly. In private discussions with exiles I noticed the pattern of otherwise reasonable, 
some highly educated, people voicing quite spectacular worries, bordering on conspiracy. 
When I noted the possibility I was observing decertification in action I refined my interview 
questions to test for this without leading the interviewee. Rather than ask about rumours and 



































































decertification behaves, after a point, in a way that is self-reinforcing. Pre-exile 
institutional path dependence delegitimised activism or focussed political claim-making 
within arenas that did not challenge the regime’s hegemony. Post-exile decertification 
has become a part of the movement itself as fear and rumour (founded or unfounded) 
inhibit the diffusion of activism. 
Egyptians arriving in England are accustomed to fear and mistrust of authority. 
Although they are objectively safer in England their previous life experiences have 
taught them to avoid political contestations. Previous researchers have argued that 
Egyptians abroad are as mistrustful of authority as Egyptians at home citing examples 
such as occasions of Egyptians forgoing their right to vote at the local embassy due to 
fear of surveillance (Morsi, 2000; Baraulina et al, 2007). Yet that is not to suggest that 
within exile mobilising structures any general sense of conspiracy or atmosphere of 
intrigue exists. My anecdotal experience in the field is that Egyptian exiles are more or 
less reasonable people and this sense is echoed by other researchers working with the 
same group (Underhill, 2016). Nonetheless unfounded rumours are actively prohibiting 
mobilisations. 
Rumour 
Rumour is known to social movement scholars as a variable that can compel panics or 
equally initiate a mobilisation (Fine and Turner, 2001; Polletta, 2006). By rumour, I 
mean, quite narrowly, information that is spread without “secure standards of evidence” 
                                                                                                                                               
participation. I would follow up within the same interview or in further correspondence if a 
participant did describe rumours to me by asking them more directly about rumour and fear, 
in this way I felt confident that I had checked my interpretations with the participants, 



































































(Fine, 2013: 1594). For empirical reasons there is no need to think of rumours as being 
more or less widespread. What matters here is the impact rumours can have on 
mobilisation. A rumour can have no truth yet still have enough purchase to dissuade 
potential activists from joining a march.9  
Rumours damage the reputations of SMOs. In Egypt the revolutionary socialists 
were rumoured to have been infiltrated by Egyptian secret police (Interview 4, 6, 11). 
The leadership of the RSE in England deny this (Ali, 2011). Evidence supports the 
RSE’s claims to independence; several of their members are currently political prisoners 
(Interview 7,14). (Yet the nature of conspiracy theories is that they cannot be falsified 
with counter-evidence). Would-be RSE supporters and volunteers in English exile 
looked for British organisations, the British Communist Party and Socialist Workers 
Party, to work with instead of the RSE in order to avoid surveillance by Egyptian 
security forces (Interview 6, 11). Counterfactually it is possible that this rumour of 
infiltration accounts for the absence of Egyptian SMOs from the English scene, 
significant given that former senior activists from both Kefaya and April 6 now live in 
London (Interview 6). Both Kefaya and April 6 have been victims of the same rumours 
(Interview 3, 7). Later I will discuss brokerage as a counterweight to decertification, 
using the example of the Justice for Giulio campaign. In fact RSE activists collaborating 
with UK SMOs such as the Socialist Workers Party provide an example of brokered 
solutions to the challenges of rumours. RSE activists addressing SWP conferences 
                                                 
9 Collective action situations are the ideal conditions for rumours to spread. Shibutani (1966) 
argued as much in his analysis of rumours in Japanese-American internment camps. Polletta 
(2006) found similar results in her study of movement diffusion. In these studies researchers 
observed activists developing rumours either to fill in gaps in official discourse, or to counter 



































































redirects the energy of activists deterred by rumours of infiltration at the same time as 
expanding activist networks and repertoires. 
As mentioned above, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest Egyptians may 
broadly distrust authority. This is a normal outcome of decades of dictatorship. Given 
the brutality of the Egyptian regime there are legitimate security concerns surrounding 
Egyptian activism, even from exile.10 A surprising number of Egyptians in London view 
of the Egyptian embassy as an institution whose function is surveillance of the Egyptian 
diaspora. Would-be activists worry that if they are identified by diplomatic staff they 
will be arrested when they return to Egypt to visit their family. Indeed some activists do 
claim that they are subjected to harassment by airport security every time they fly to or 
from Cairo (Interview 10). Related to this Egyptians worry that if they are identified as 
part of an opposition abroad their families in Egypt will be harassed or even arrested by 
security forces (Interview 10). In this sense, the Egyptian embassy is a bold choice of 
location for protests by the MB.  
Rumours about the role of the Egyptian embassy and about repercussions for 
family have a direct impact on participation in contentious actions. Both Egyptian and 
UK based SMOs are aware of these concerns and have strategies for tackling them. 
                                                 
10 This is among the reasons I have protected the identities of my informants. Although the 
Egyptians I worked with in England were probably the bravest people I will ever meet, their 
real security concerns affected my work from the offset. Basically every activist I met 
assumed I was working undercover for the Egyptian embassy. This meant I could not 
interview activists online, which would have reduced the costs of the study. I had to go to 
London to meet these people and earn their trust. Even then, the Egyptian exiles I met are so 




































































More than any SMO, supporters of the MB have managed to mobilise protesters on the 
street. Partly this is attributable to their persistence organising events on a monthly, 
sometimes fortnightly, basis. Partly it is attributable to the style of event they host, with 
entertainment on a family friendly model, which makes the events feel less contentious. 
ESI experimented briefly with coordinating protest campaigns in England and Egypt 
simultaneously but decided to restrict their activities to the UK, partly to allay fears of 
repercussions for family members (Interview 13). Activists within the movement, both 
Egyptian and non-Egyptian, have noticed these issues and acted as brokers to overcome 
the challenges of decertification. 
Unlike in the broader historical sense decertification at this stage in the exile 
process does not rely on any actual input from external authorities. Activists have 
internalised perceptions of the regime’s danger and power (which in part motivated 
their original flight) and these are sufficient to ensure decertification continues to 
function and is in this sense self-reinforcing. 
Brokerage: A Counterbalance to Decertification 
Sympathetic British activists are as much a part of this story as Egyptians in exile. 
When motivation is low among Egyptians or security concerns are high there are 
influential allies there to persuade Egyptians into action or to mobilise on their behalf. 
Where decertification worked to convince Egyptians activism would either be futile or 
counter-productive, brokerage was set in motion by ‘political entrepreneurs’ who 
brought Egyptians into contact with their allies (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 13). In order 
to observe the function of brokerage it is necessary to examine the exile SMOs and their 
actions in detail. Following the account of exiled activism I will offer the case of Justice 



































































The Muslim Brotherhood in England 
Both in organisational terms and in mobilisation capacity the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) have the most extensive apparatus in England. This is partly because their 
presence in England, and across Europe, has been established since their earlier 
proscribed periods in the 20th century. Before 2013 MB in England benefited from 
funding by the Gulf states but none the less lacked the self-confidence to organise under 
their own name preferring to mobilise through proxy organisations (Rich, 2010: 131; 
Whine, 2005: 35). After the 2013 coup the Brotherhood reportedly shifted their 
headquarters to north London to avoid persecution (The Times, May 15, 2015). Yet the 
move appears to have been abandoned or motivated by PR purposes (Channel 4 News, 
2015).  
Despite having taken up semi-official residence in London it is more meaningful 
to talk of the MB in England as an SMO rather than a party. That is to say that given the 
size of the MB in Egypt and abroad, in London as with other European capitals, the MB 
have substantial numbers of supporters and followers rather than members over whom 
the leadership could exert direct control (Interviews 2, 8, 10). So in London, the label 
SMO appropriately describes the range of more and less formal organisations that 
support the MB.  
The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), for example, is a respectable 
Muslim, civil society organisation in the UK that happens to be ‘dominated’ by 
supporters of the MB, to use the language of a UK government report (Jenkins and Farr, 
2015: 23).11 The MAB have worked with the UK government in combatting terrorism 
                                                 
11 The UK government in 2015 published redacted findings from a report into the ‘activities’ of 



































































within the UK, for instance by assisting police in their operation to remove Abu Hamza 
from his central London mosque. Yet they share the goals and values of the MB, have 
been active in London mayoral elections (supporting Ken Livingstone and Sadiq Khan) 
and sending speakers and grassroots members to MB protests (Interview 16). MB 
supporters in London have an online presence primarily through Facebook pages, in 
particular R4BIA, British Egyptians for Democracy and Stop Sisi (Jenkins and Farr, 
2015: 26). The former is an ongoing campaign that protests regularly on the streets of 
London and provides an online forum for raising awareness of Brotherhood claims. 
Stop Sisi is a campaign that was established to mobilise protest on the streets of London 
to coincide with Sisi’s state visit to the UK.  
Characterising the Brotherhood’s ideology is complicated by internal debates 
(Naguib, 2009: 105). These in turn shed more light on the specific character of the 
organisation in London. The London leadership in late 2015 were embroiled in a power 
struggle with the new Egyptian leadership which had elected a radical spokesperson 
who had publicly condoned the use of violence in politics. London attempted to impose 
a moderate candidate for leader suggesting the commitment to democracy in England is 
strong (Mada Masr, 2015). As is well known the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is 
Islamist and their commitment to democracy has for most of their history been far from 
assured. Nonetheless their claims to democratic legitimacy have dominated their 
discourse in the west since the Raab’a massacre of 2013 in which the military 
dictatorship brutally killed thousands of their members and supporters. The Brotherhood 
pioneered the ‘secret cell’ structure that has characterised Islamist groups subsequently 
and therefore it is futile to attempt to put a figure to their English membership. 
Nonetheless it is clear to any observer who has spent time attending protests or events in 



































































force of numbers (Underhill, 2016, 28-29). This is partly because unaffiliated Islamists 
are willing to lend their support to Brotherhood events (Interviews 6, 10). 
On the streets of London supporters of the MB have claimed a space for their 
protests outside of the Egyptian Embassy which they often march to from Marble Arch. 
Their protests reveal aspects of their discourse that attempts to state their democratic 
claims to power in Egypt while simultaneously affirming their identity as British 
Egyptians. For example, bearded Islamists have posed for photos on protest at the 
embassy atop ‘Boris Bikes’, civic bicycles introduced to London by former mayor Boris 
Johnson. Another claim making technique used by MB supporters is the use of 
protesting wearing the face of deposed MB president Morsi as a mask. 
Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt (RSE) 
The RSE are a Trotskyist political faction who have operated in Egypt since circa 2003. 
Similar to the MB some of their prominent and grassroots members have been political 
prisoners since the 2013 coup. Their numbers have always been smaller than those of 
the MB, the 2003 protests in solidarity with Palestine remained, until the 2011 
revolution, their primary period of recruitment (Ali, 2011). Despite organising in a 
manner reminiscent of formal political parties the RSE have refused to grant successive 
Egyptian dictatorships approval by participating in fraudulent elections and have opted 
instead to voice their political claims through extra-parliamentary yet nonviolent 
activism (El-Hamalawy, 2011). 
Since the coup those members of the RSE leadership who have evaded arrest 
have relocated to England where they have taken up roles as guest scholars at UK 
universities. From English exile they have continued their work of peaceful activism, 
yet unlike the Muslim Brothers the RSE have focussed on working with English 



































































Revolutionary Socialists have not maintained a presence outside the Egyptian embassy 
and were absent from anti-Sisi protests at Downing street (Interview 10, 15). The RSE 
have nurtured connections with British socialist organisations such as the Socialist 
Workers Party whose conference they have addressed three years running (Interview 7).  
Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI) 
When Egyptians in exile have shown reticence voicing their political claims, 
sympathetic allies have mobilised on their behalf, doing what they could to encourage 
exiled activism. Since 2014 The Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI) has developed a brand 
that is known within activist circles. A nimble and effective outfit, born of the UK trade 
union movement, ESI mobilises union resources around campaigns in solidarity with 
the repressed workers movement in Egypt. Nimble because, rather than develop a new 
organisation, when its organisers perceived a need for an Egypt specific campaign they 
launched the organisation as a campaign belonging to, and with access to resources 
belonging to, a previously established wing of trade unionism, the MENA solidarity 
network (Interview 14). Similar to other SMOs discussed in this paper ESI are able to 
operate with, in this case, union resources with comparatively low costs as they avoid 
the administration involved with a formal membership structure. Grassroots ESI 
activists are volunteers borrowed from trade union and student movements whose 
actions are directed (in a collective sense) by a permanent steering group (Interviews 
14, 15).  
Their effectiveness, a function of tactics, is evident in movement outcomes. ESI 
campaigns have reached a level of brand recognition such that on most campaign 
literature the ESI logo appears alongside the MENA solidarity logo in order to lend 
some prestige to the latter, although the two are in reality not distinct units (Interview 



































































trade union movement such as the late Bob Crowe, John McDonnell and Jeremy 
Corbyn who were present at the founding meeting and lend their own prestige to the 
movement. Day to day however the group is staffed by a core of dedicated activists who 
have day jobs, are less well known to the UK public, and for varying reasons happen to 
have a particular interest in the Egyptian workers movement (Interviews 14, 15). 
ESI are open about their trade union funding sources which are listed on their 
website in order to avoid accusations of political subterfuge by Egyptian authorities. For 
the same reason (in addition to security fears) ESI restrict their activism to within the 
UK. Since 2014 they have staged a number of creative public protests in London 
designed to draw public attention to human rights violations and workers’ struggles in 
Egypt. An analogous tactic has been to piggy-back on larger protests, such as students 
marches and protests after Brexit in order to spread their message at street level. 
Their most ambitious, and probably most effective, actions have been two 
conferences on the topic of Arab counter-revolutions and the publication a quarterly 
journal, in the format of a glossy magazine. 
Non-partisan Activism 
Other activists in England prefer to lend their support to events rather than to any group 
or ideology. These people are the grassroots of the movement, which is something 
distinct from a political party in any case. Movements, more than parties, are fluid and 
share supporters between and across chapters. These activists are the real colour and 
emotion of the exile scene. There is, for example, an Egyptian singer living in London 
who in 2011 had performed on stage in Tahrir Square songs she had composed for the 
revolution. She left Egypt following the coup and now sings love songs in night clubs 
around England but also performs the songs of revolution at exile protests (Interview 9). 



































































activist organisers who implicitly or explicitly understand that music can offer more 
selective incentives (the solution to Olsen’s collective action problem) than a noble 
cause can. 
Several alliances have been established between exiles and British activists. 
Several Labour MPs have devoted parliamentary and extra-parliamentary resources to 
working with the movement. John McDonnell is a long-term member of the ESI 
steering committee and along with Jeremy Corbyn have both appeared on ESI marches 
(Interview 14; Middle East Solidarity Autumn 2015: 22). Daniel Zeichner, discussed in 
more detail below, the Labour MP for Cambridge has worked with Amnesty and ESI on 
the campaign against police brutality in Egypt (Interview 13). Even the artist Banksy 
has worked with Egyptian exiles who worked on the Arab Spring themed artwork in his 
‘Dismaland’ exhibition (Interview 7; Mada Masr, September 27, 2015). 
Justice for Giulio 
We have already considered brief examples of brokerage at work in how SMOs dealt 
with the challenges of decertification. Take the campaign surrounding Giulio Regeini as 
illustrative of the process in more detail.12 Brokerage is at work whenever activists 
cooperate, and is of greater analytical significance whenever SMOs cooperate, the case 
of Regeini is an excellent example of SMOs cooperating with non-movement actors 
                                                 
12 An equally telling example is that of the protests surrounding president Sisi’s visit to 
Downing Street. These protests brought the full ideological spectrum of exiled activists onto 
the streets in common cause (as well as a bus of Sisi supporters) (The Times, November 5, 
2015; Middle East Solidarity, Spring 2016: 22). However, in the run up to the visit MB 
activists actually reached out to secular and socialist organisations to coordinate activities 



































































over a sustained campaign. Regeini was an Italian PhD student at Cambridge University 
researching independent trade union activity in post-revolution Egypt. He died in Egypt 
while on field work, his death bearing all the hallmarks of murder by the secret police. 
His body, found by the side of the road, bore the scars of torture. The case caused some 
outrage in the UK and Italy. For Egyptians torture and disappearance are common 
occurrences which invariably go unreported in the West. Regeini’s death brought the 
story home to UK news audience. A campaign called Justice for Giulio was set up by 
political entrepreneurs who brought Egyptian and English activists together. 
The campaign began when the MP for Cambridge, Daniel Zeichner, took 
ownership of the matter and contacted Amnesty International (Interviews 5, 13, 14). He 
proposed a partnership to raise the profile of the issue. Zeichner, on his own initiative, 
first handled the case as a constituency matter acting independently. He raised the issue 
in parliament working with opposition MPs to raise an early day motion calling on the 
government to investigate the causes of death. He met with staff at Cambridge 
University to review security and ethical procedures. He also met with Regeini’s parents 
at the European parliament.  However, Zeichner, worked with Amnesty to bring the 
power of activism to bear on the issue. Zeichner organised town hall meetings in 
Cambridge where the issue was important to students and residents. Meetings were 
addressed by Zeichner as well as representatives of Amnesty, ESI (on the invitation of 
Amnesty) and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) (Interview 12). The campaign 
spread as Amnesty produced campaign materials (placards, t-shirts, leaflets) which ESI 
took to the streets, campuses and conferences. ESI also used their magazine to report on 
and raise the profile of the issue.  
The case may have had more resonance for the wider British audience than it did 



































































torture, disappearance and state killings are an ordinary part of life in Egypt. Brokerage 
kicked in when Zeichner performed the functions of a political entrepreneur, connecting 
previously unconnected groups, including but not restricted to Amnesty, ESI, and the 
NUJ, initiating a fresh wave of activism in so doing. This example is compelling 
because it illustrates how, by connecting diverse SMOs and allies around a single issue 
the mechanism fundamentally altered the character of the exile mobilizing structure 
both in terms of its network and its repertoire. 
Comparing Activism in Egypt and England 
The move from Egypt to England coincided with changes both in opportunities for 
activism and the forms it took. The convergence of institutional exclusion and 
repression in Egypt make the Egyptian polity appear ‘closed’ to activism, at least 
relative the stable English polity with its established division of powers, multi-layered 
representation and availability of political allies for activists. The repertoire of exile is 
more diverse than the Egyptian repertoire. Activists in England have found a home on 
campus and have directed much of their energy toward intellectual activities (research, 
conferences) that straddle the boundary between research and activism. The Egyptian 
end of the spectrum is fundamentally more radical as it contains riots, the English 
repertoire being more peaceful. 
The attention to the mechanics of exile in the case study however suggests that 
variation in opportunities and repertoire is more than simply the initial conditions giving 
way to subsequent conditions. Decertification and brokerage connect activism before 
and after exile as well as connecting exiled activism to other instances of contentious 
politics. Both mechanisms appear as historical constants yet exhibit variation at a micro-
sociological level entailing different outcomes. Prior to exile decertification was 



































































control political claim-making. After exile the input of an external authority became 
superfluous as the effects of political censorship became self-reinforcing through 
rumours and fears. Brokerage meanwhile, though present in inter-SMO cooperation in 
Egypt, took on an added dimension in England where allies of the movement as diverse 
as interested observers, trades unions and Members of Parliament acted to integrate 
exiles into the everyday political claim-making of the host country.  
Conclusion: The Mechanics of Exile 
When exiles left Egypt for England they left behind a culture of suspicion that expressly 
prohibited political engagement. Most if not all had been present in the Tahrir 
revolution, arguably the first iconic moment of democratic history in the 21st century, 
but arrived in England fatigued, unengaged and often scared. In the permissive political 
culture of cosmopolitan London their movement flourished, contrary to the implicit 
aims of the authoritarian regime whose unofficial policy of exile had initiated the 
process. Yet it did not have to turn out like this. Had exile operated as the military 
regime of Egypt had intended the movement would have burned out into apathy. As it 
transpired exile did change activism, but it did not put a stop to it. 
Analytically I have suggested that decertification and brokerage explain much of 
the mobilisation observed. Decertification has historical precedents that can be traced 
back to the establishment of the mass parties in mid 20th century Egypt. I have argued 
that after the act of exile has occurred, from the apparent safety of sanctuary abroad, 
decertification becomes, or is already, internalised to the movement. Historically 
external authorities were required to discourage activism, yet the act of exile is so 
traumatic that the need for external factors becomes replaced by rumour and fear in the 



































































as political entrepreneurs connect exiles with local allies who are motivated to create 
and exploit political opportunities. 
Herein lie the key findings of this study, reflecting the broader trend in social 
movement research to progress beyond traditional cause-effect explanations to unpack 
the mechanisms which bring about puzzling variations. Decertification and brokerage 
can be said to have general purchase given they have been observed in a wide variety of 
contexts prior to this research. Their relevance here is that they can be seen to amount to 
evidence that exile is a process rather than an event. Taken in aggregate they offer one 
explanation for why exiled activism takes the form it does, yet more profoundly, they 
demonstrate why exile may hinder yet not spell an end to political participation. That is 
not to say this explanation is exhaustive; I have not, due to restrictions, touched upon 
the discourse of exiled activism. Framing processes are a well-established aspect of 
social movement theory. Nonetheless this explanation may well, subject to further 
research, be shown to hold for the process of exile generally. The case selection and 
comparative case study design were intended to support this suggestion.  Exile should 
be considered one of the major processes of contentious politics, along with well 
established areas of investigation such as mobilisation, revolution and democratisation. 
The role of rumour and fear raise interesting questions for existing accounts of 
why and how mobilisation occurs more generally. Rumours, by definition 
unsubstantiated, challenge the notion that the decision to participate is based on rational 
calculation. In fact, the evidence in this paper raises the possibility that fears preventing 
participation may be in some senses irrational, based as they are on unsubstantiated 
claims. What matters more to whether mobilisation occurs, and in which forms, are 
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Rumour and Decertification in Exile Politics: Evidence from the 
Egyptian Case 
Does exile affect activism and if so how? In this paper the case of Egyptian 
activists exiled in England is taken as illustrative of processes typical of exiled 
activism. The case study draws on primary and secondary sources including a 
series of biographical interviews with exiled activists. The analysis compares 
activism in Egypt with exiled activism in England using the participants’ critical 
self-reflections to explain the mechanisms mediating the changes. Contrary to 
reasonable expectations that exile is a spontaneous response to a change in 
political context, the conditions for exile predate banishment and lie within the 
institutions of dictatorship which decertify activism. Decertification continues 
throughout the exile process as fear of repression becomes internalised within the 
movement. Within the sanctuary of the host country a process of brokerage 
counteracts decertification expanding and modifying the exile repertoire. 
Keywords: social movements, exile, rumour, decertification, contentious politics, 
Arab Spring 
Introduction 
Exiled Activism: A New Focus for Social Movement Theory 
Before, during, even after activists’ flight from their home countries, dictatorial regimes 
undermine their participation in contentious politics. This paper addresses one of the 
surprising ways exile continues to deter activism, even from the relative safety of 
sanctuary abroad, yet how exiled activists do manage to assert relevance through 
integration. I designed the research in this paper to provide answers to questions about 
the effects exile has on mobilising structures. Are activists able to turn their exile to the 
advantage of their cause, by exploiting a new structure of opportunities abroad? While 
activists did bring networks and repertoires with them, they needed encouragement and 
assurances from each other and from new allies as their motivation was low and their 
security concerns high. 
 2 
Shain (1989) has argued exile means different things to different people because 
it is a political term with no agreed definition in international law. Sociologists view 
exiles as socially deviant while psychologists and legal scholars both view exiles as 
variants of refugees. He continues, a point I concur with, that activism by exiles is 
important enough to warrant a particular definition for political science analyses (Shain, 
2009: 387, 388). I extend Shain’s definition, arguing that from the perspective of 
political science ‘exile’ is a social phenomenon, more specifically a political process, 
best understood through the prism of social movement theory.  
Exile exists at the fringes of political science. It falls outside domestic politics 
but is not quite a matter of international relations (Roemer, 2008: 4). Nonetheless it has 
consequences for both, having been practiced throughout history (Shaw, 2000: 4). It 
was a feature of both ancient Greek (Forsdyke, 2005) and Roman politics (Shaw, 2000). 
‘Exile’ is therefore a modern way to describe an ancient practice. In the 
twentieth century relevant research included psychological studies of the impact the 
isolation of exile has on the psyche and articulations of personal identity (Edinger, 
1956; Kunz, 1973). Sznajder and Roniger accurately describe exile as “a mechanism of 
institutional exclusion – not the only one – by which a person involved in politics and 
public life, or perceived by power holders as such, is forced or pressed to leave his or 
her home country or place of residence, unable to return until a change in political 
circumstances takes place” (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009: 11). 
They have made this argument in detail elsewhere in a study claiming the rise of 
exile organisations (NGOs and intergovernmental agencies) in the 1970s altered the 
context for transnational activism favourably for activists (Sznajder and Roniger, 2007). 
Shain and Ahran (2003) documented a similar process in the United States where 
organised exiles have had success in lobbying on foreign policy. Unlike these studies 
 3 
that focused on private forms of political participation such as lobbying and financial 
flows the subject of this paper is the continuing public political participation of exiles. 
The evidence in this paper is from the case of Egyptians living in England. This 
case is important in its own right but also has important lessons for social movement 
theory. Since 2013 the military in Egypt has retaken control of the state apparatus, 
massacring its main opponent, quelling a popular uprising and instigating a period of 
terror unknown in Egypt since the 1950s (Marfleet, 2016). For most of the period of this 
research Egypt was the country with the second highest number of journalists jailed, but 
has since been surpassed by Turkey (CPJ, 2017). The reintroduction of protest laws has 
made any public gathering, let alone political claim-making, offences carrying a prison 
sentence. Not for the first time in Egyptian history the terrifying practice of 
‘disappearances’ has become a norm. Egyptians moving to England are in this context 
moving from one of the most repressive countries globally to one of the freest. If 
activists can mobilise anywhere surely it is in one of the worlds’ oldest democracies. 
Nonetheless, the little large-n data there is on exile suggests that activists forced abroad 
after a military takeover sit more or less on the line of best fit in the distribution of cases 
(Binningsbø et al, 2012). The case is therefore so extreme, yet so typical on key 
indicators, it is reasonable to think lessons can be drawn for theory and for other 
activists elsewhere (Beach and Pedersen, 2016). 
Using the example of the Egyptian case, I was able to disaggregate the process 
of exile into a number of mechanisms, in this paper I discuss two; decertification1 and 
                                                 
1 Decertification has been defined “as an external authority’s signal that it is withdrawing 
recognition and support from a political actor” (Tarrow and Tilly, 2012: 215). Gentile’s 
ethnographic and archival research, of relevance, has identified contractual blockages in 
 4 
brokerage.2 The fact of decertification continuing after exile implies a legacy effect of 
an historical path dependency as successive Egyptian governments have sought to 
delegitimise activism. I find evidence of this in the prevalence of rumours and fear, 
internalised within the movement. Brokerage counteracts this in the sense of 
cooperation between exiles and newfound allies enlarging the scope of political 
opportunities. 
In putting this case study together, I assembled sources of evidence which I 
analysed relying on concepts from process tracing and the theoretical framework 
provided by contentious politics. I favoured a qualitative approach to evidencing these 
mechanisms for two reasons. First, I followed advice in the literature about difficulties 
in identifying indicators of mechanisms and the strength of case studies in developing 
observations of mechanisms (Falletti and Lynch, 2008; Staggenborg, 2002). Second, 
life-history inspired approaches are well-suited to studies of exile. This has to do with a 
variety of factors ranging from the personal intimacy of the exile experience to the 
protracted character of the process of exile (Cornejo, 2008; Shahidian, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                               
certification which have prevented European trade unions from coalition building (Gentile, 
2016). 
2 In contentious politics brokerage is commonly understood as the “production of a new 
connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites” (Tarrow and Tilly, 
2012: 215). In historical cases SMOs were the only suitably resourced actors to function as 
brokers, but in the age of social media this role can be taken over by looser knit associations 
or even individuals (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012). Hence, in pre-exile Egyptian activism 
researchers have argued the mechanism brokerage as part of a transnational diffusion 
process, was crucial in increasing the frequency and volume of contention in Egypt in the 
years preceding the Tahrir revolution (Abdelrahman, 2011). 
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The research lasted three years involving four field trips, three in London, one in 
Manchester as well as video conference style interviews with Egyptians living in 
London, Cambridge, Birmingham, Exeter, Manchester and Liverpool. In all I 
interviewed twenty-two Egyptians resident in England, plus six allies and observers of 
the London Egyptian activism scene. I used the interviews to understand the 
participants’ critical self-interpretations of why they did or did not participate in 
activism. In seeking to understand how exile affected activism it was necessary to 
examine the history of exiled activism, and the level of detail that required exceeded the 
memory of even the most observant eye-witness. The descriptive parts of the case study 
are therefore also based on documentary sources of various types. Using the Nexus 
database I corroborated as many of these events as possible based on reports in national 
UK newspapers, regional English newspapers and local London newspapers. A further 
source was the activist organisations (SMOs) themselves. SMOs produce literature that 
is of interest and in the age of social media inadvertently create a record of their 
activities through public event invitations. 
The paper begins with a fresh account of the history of Egyptian activism in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, reinterpreted in light of modern theories of 
contentious politics. This account is brief, sufficient to contrast with the rest of the 
paper which contains an account of exiled activism in England, mostly in London. I 
consider the ‘exile movement’ in terms of its organisation and its actions. I argue that 
both in terms of recruitment and participation decertification continues to act as a 
deterrent as activists fear the reach of the military regime through the London embassy. 
The paper concludes with a comparison of the conditions and mechanisms of activism 
before and after exile in which I try to suggest the ways that the experience of Egyptians 
in England may contribute significant observations to theories of contentious politics. 
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Historical Roots of Decertification 
The root causes of contemporary Egyptian exile are to be found not in the recent coup 
d’etat, but in another one, more than half a century earlier. Nasser’s coup in 1952 closed 
off political opportunities for activists and initiated the process of decertification that 
pushed activists seeking to create their own opportunities to the margins, to the ultimate 
extent of exile in the modern era.3 Following the Free Officer’s (FO) coup the first 
social group to voice their political claims were textile workers in the industrial town 
Kafr Al-Dawr. Their protest was an industrial dispute with their private sector 
employers over pay and conditions that was not necessarily a matter of contentious 
politics.4 However, the workers shrewdly took advantage of political instability caused 
by the FO coup to frame their claims as politically motivated. Although their 
                                                 
3 Context for this argument comes in an extended quote from Marfleet (2016). Marfleet presents 
evidence masterfully demonstrating the ideology underpinning decertification was brought 
to Egypt by British colonisers. He goes on to argue this was opportunistically appropriated 
later by secular Egyptian autocrats (Marfleet, 2016: 21-23).  
“In Egypt, occupied by British forces in 1882, the colonial administration combined 
suspicion of the mass of people with a conviction that they lacked capacities to modify 
both their material circumstances and their subordinate political status. According to 
the British administrator Alfred (later Viscount) Milner, the people of Egypt were 
‘docile and good tempered’; they were ‘a nation of submissive slaves, not only bereft 
of any vestige of liberal institutions but devoid of any spark of the spirit of liberty; 
(Milner, 2002 [1892]: 178). At the same time they were ‘in the grip of a religion the 
most intolerant and fanatical’ (Milner, 2002 [1892]:2). Egyptians required European 
rule and reform: British military occupation, Milner suggested, had succeeded in 
bringing a ‘revolution’ to their lives in the form of new institutions of administration 
and justice (Milner, 2002 [1982]: 5).” (Marleet, 2016: 18). 
4 Strictly speaking contentious politics are interactions involving state actors. 
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declarations of loyalty to the new regime may have helped convince management (well 
known supporters of the monarchy that was replaced by the FO) to make concessions 
the response of the state made the new regime’s approach to activism clear. Five-
hundred and forty-nine strikers were arrested with three leaders sentenced to death (one 
received a reduced life sentence). This event established the precedent for activism in 
the first two terms of indigenous Egyptian dictatorship (Abdalla, 1985; Erlich, 1989; 
Vatikiotis, 1978; Vatikiotis, 1980). 
The years from 1968 until 1976 were years of student radicalism.5 In particular 
the episodes of 1968 and 1972 have become known in the popular history of student 
activism as years of ‘uprising’. This phase of activism was also initiated by perceptions 
of political instability when workers marched in protest against defeat in the six-day war 
between Israel and the Arab nations. In 1968 following workers’ protests at Helwan 
students at Cairo University formed a twelve-man committee to coordinate and organise 
protests in solidarity with marching workers. This committee organised contentious 
performances including marches, sit-ins and static demonstrations. Members of the 
committee were allowed into the parliament to put their demands to Sadat who at the 
time was speaker of the house; they were later arrested. The committee also managed to 
coordinate, by telephone, simultaneous student marches in Cairo and Alexandria. 
                                                 
5 The historical record of activism contains a gap between 1954 and 1968. “In the following 
days students passed beyond the university gates and made their presence felt on the streets 
of Cairo and Alexandria for the first time since 1954." (Abdalla, 1985: 149,150). “The 
student riots and workers' demonstrations of February 1968, however, came as an 
unexpected blow to Nasser's recovery from the 1967 debacle. In magnitude and ferocity they 
were the first since 1954, indeed since 1952.” (Vatikiotis, 1978: 185). 
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The dearth of activism during the first two terms of indigenous dictatorship is in 
part explained by repression, but also due to the replacement of political parties with 
unique, pro-regime mass-parties designed to redirect political claim-making6 (Abdalla, 
1985: 127; Binder, 1969: 401; Wickham, 2002: 29). That this was successful in 
commencing the process of decertification in this period is evident in the re-emergence 
of more explicitly political protest in Mubarak’s era, with the reestablishment of a 
(flawed) multi-party system.7 When, in 2003, America invaded Iraq, protesters gathered 
in Cairo’s Tahrir Square (Sachs, 2003). The protests were not overtly subversive as their 
demands were anti-American, not anti-Mubarak. Yet they met with repression and 
dispersal, a job the police were ruthless in carrying out. Through criticism of American 
foreign policy Egyptian protesters were criticising their own allied government by 
association. 
Following the anti-war demonstrations Tahrir Square became a regular venue 
for protest (Interview 1, 4). The Egyptian public became accustomed to two relatively 
novel aspects of political expression and one well known aspect: public claim-making, 
organised protest and repression. The first to organise were ‘Kefaya!’: a group of pro-
democracy activists whose name in Arabic means ‘Enough!’. Kefaya were primarily 
protesting censorship under the regime and merely asserted their claimed right to protest 
(Interview 6). Their more ambitious long-term aim, however, was to prevent a Mubarak 
                                                 
6 “[T]hey [the FO] were not opposed to parties as such, only to their corrupt leaders. Thus the 
Liberation Rally was designed not as a party, but as an instrument for the reorganisation of 
popular forces.” Nasser quoted in (Vatikiotis, 1978: 134). 
7 The exception to this trend towards politicisation being protests surrounding the Danish 
publication of cartoons depicting images offensive to some Muslims (Sami, Al-Ahram, 
2006). 
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family succession and ensure the presidency did not fall to Hosni’s son Gamal 
(Marfleet, 2016, 49). Their first protest was small. Protesters gathered in Tahrir square 
for a silent protest wearing yellow stickers on their mouth to symbolise the regime’s 
censorship (El-Mahdi, 2009: 89; Khalil, 2012: 62). The protest was repressed (Naguib, 
2011: 9; Oweidat et al, 2008: 11). 
Yet Kefaya continued agitation and from time to time staged protests (GNAD, 
2005). Their method was innovative for the period as they organised entirely online. 
The absence of a physical headquarters in their earliest days seems to have guarded 
against surveillance by a regime caught by surprise. Even after the activists disbanded 
the group left a legacy on Egyptian activism in various blogs which served as an 
alternative press in the days before a regime to could dismiss citizen journalism as ‘fake 
news’ (Lim, 2012; 235-238). 
A new group of activists led by Ahmed Maher tried to broaden the base of 
protest by calling a general strike on the 6th of April 2008. The strike led to two days of 
violent clashes between riot police and workers at Egypt’s largest textile factory at the 
Nile delta (Khalil, 2012: 72,73). The group took the date April 6th as their name. The 
strike was intended to extend opposition to include both the youth and the industrial 
working class (Interview 1; Marfleet, 2016: 50). The movement was successful in this 
regard. In discussions exiles in England have stressed the ongoing motivational effects 
of the solidarity achieved between social classes during the April 6 campaign 
(Interviews 1, 5, 6, 7). Observers such as Naguib and Marfleet (2016, 50) have argued 
the networks developed between activists and trade unions during this campaign 
mattered more to mobilisation in the 2011 revolution than the networks developed by 
Kefaya. 
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Summary: The Transformation of Activism in Egypt 
As political opportunities in Egypt were monopolised by the regime, activism 
underwent a process of decertification. The historical record shows that not only was 
activism discouraged it was also physically contained. Whereas when Nasser took 
power in the 1950s contention had been geographically dispersed, with the industrial 
periphery at least as active as the centres of political and executive power in Cairo and 
Alexandria. This containment of activism is further evident in the Egyptian activism 
repertoire. At the beginning of the period surveyed protesters marched as they made 
their claims. Then, by the modern period when basically all activism had migrated to 
Cairo, the ‘occupation’ style protest came to dominate, almost as if the protests had 
come to a standstill. Today, even outside of Egypt, ‘Tahrir’ is often taken as a symbol of 
liberation and rebellion. Viewed through this historical lens it seems just as reasonable 
to think of it not as a liberated space but as one where activists are cornered. 
Decertification: The Effects of Rumours within the Movement 
Decertification continues to operate even after the act of exile, prohibiting new 
mobilisations from abroad. In particular, decertification at this micro-sociological level 
manifests itself in the spread of rumours within activist circles, or mobilising 
structures.8 As rumours are endogenous (to the mobilising structures) this suggests that 
                                                 
8 The observation this section discusses was made in the field and did change my research plan 
significantly. In private discussions with exiles I noticed the pattern of otherwise reasonable, 
some highly educated, people voicing quite spectacular worries, bordering on conspiracy. 
When I noted the possibility I was observing decertification in action I refined my interview 
questions to test for this without leading the interviewee. Rather than ask about rumours and 
fears directly I would ask about challenges in mobilising activists or reasons for non-
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decertification behaves, after a point, in a way that is self-reinforcing. Pre-exile 
institutional path dependence delegitimised activism or focussed political claim-making 
within arenas that did not challenge the regime’s hegemony. Post-exile decertification 
has become a part of the movement itself as fear and rumour (founded or unfounded) 
inhibit the diffusion of activism. 
Egyptians arriving in England are accustomed to fear and mistrust of authority. 
Although they are objectively safer in England their previous life experiences have 
taught them to avoid political contestations. Previous researchers have argued that 
Egyptians abroad are as mistrustful of authority as Egyptians at home citing examples 
such as occasions of Egyptians forgoing their right to vote at the local embassy due to 
fear of surveillance (Morsi, 2000; Baraulina et al, 2007). Yet that is not to suggest that 
within exile mobilising structures any general sense of conspiracy or atmosphere of 
intrigue exists. My anecdotal experience in the field is that Egyptian exiles are more or 
less reasonable people and this sense is echoed by other researchers working with the 
same group (Underhill, 2016). Nonetheless unfounded rumours are actively prohibiting 
mobilisations. 
Rumour 
Rumour is known to social movement scholars as a variable that can compel panics or 
equally initiate a mobilisation (Fine and Turner, 2001; Polletta, 2006). By rumour, I 
mean, quite narrowly, information that is spread without “secure standards of evidence” 
                                                                                                                                               
participation. I would follow up within the same interview or in further correspondence if a 
participant did describe rumours to me by asking them more directly about rumour and fear, 
in this way I felt confident that I had checked my interpretations with the participants, 
without putting words in their mouth. 
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(Fine, 2013: 1594). For empirical reasons there is no need to think of rumours as being 
more or less widespread. What matters here is the impact rumours can have on 
mobilisation. A rumour can have no truth yet still have enough purchase to dissuade 
potential activists from joining a march.9  
Rumours damage the reputations of SMOs. In Egypt the revolutionary socialists 
were rumoured to have been infiltrated by Egyptian secret police (Interview 4, 6, 11). 
The leadership of the RSE in England deny this (Ali, 2011). Evidence supports the 
RSE’s claims to independence; several of their members are currently political prisoners 
(Interview 7,14). (Yet the nature of conspiracy theories is that they cannot be falsified 
with counter-evidence). Would-be RSE supporters and volunteers in English exile 
looked for British organisations, the British Communist Party and Socialist Workers 
Party, to work with instead of the RSE in order to avoid surveillance by Egyptian 
security forces (Interview 6, 11). Counterfactually it is possible that this rumour of 
infiltration accounts for the absence of Egyptian SMOs from the English scene, 
significant given that former senior activists from both Kefaya and April 6 now live in 
London (Interview 6). Both Kefaya and April 6 have been victims of the same rumours 
(Interview 3, 7). Later I will discuss brokerage as a counterweight to decertification, 
using the example of the Justice for Giulio campaign. In fact RSE activists collaborating 
with UK SMOs such as the Socialist Workers Party provide an example of brokered 
solutions to the challenges of rumours. RSE activists addressing SWP conferences 
                                                 
9 Collective action situations are the ideal conditions for rumours to spread. Shibutani (1966) 
argued as much in his analysis of rumours in Japanese-American internment camps. Polletta 
(2006) found similar results in her study of movement diffusion. In these studies researchers 
observed activists developing rumours either to fill in gaps in official discourse, or to counter 
information from official sources that was contrary to their movement’s discourse. 
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redirects the energy of activists deterred by rumours of infiltration at the same time as 
expanding activist networks and repertoires. 
As mentioned above, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest Egyptians may 
broadly distrust authority. This is a normal outcome of decades of dictatorship. Given 
the brutality of the Egyptian regime there are legitimate security concerns surrounding 
Egyptian activism, even from exile.10 A surprising number of Egyptians in London view 
of the Egyptian embassy as an institution whose function is surveillance of the Egyptian 
diaspora. Would-be activists worry that if they are identified by diplomatic staff they 
will be arrested when they return to Egypt to visit their family. Indeed some activists do 
claim that they are subjected to harassment by airport security every time they fly to or 
from Cairo (Interview 10). Related to this Egyptians worry that if they are identified as 
part of an opposition abroad their families in Egypt will be harassed or even arrested by 
security forces (Interview 10). In this sense, the Egyptian embassy is a bold choice of 
location for protests by the MB.  
Rumours about the role of the Egyptian embassy and about repercussions for 
family have a direct impact on participation in contentious actions. Both Egyptian and 
UK based SMOs are aware of these concerns and have strategies for tackling them. 
                                                 
10 This is among the reasons I have protected the identities of my informants. Although the 
Egyptians I worked with in England were probably the bravest people I will ever meet, their 
real security concerns affected my work from the offset. Basically every activist I met 
assumed I was working undercover for the Egyptian embassy. This meant I could not 
interview activists online, which would have reduced the costs of the study. I had to go to 
London to meet these people and earn their trust. Even then, the Egyptian exiles I met are so 
mistrustful I was unable to ever employ a snowball sampling technique as had been my 
intention. 
 14 
More than any SMO, supporters of the MB have managed to mobilise protesters on the 
street. Partly this is attributable to their persistence organising events on a monthly, 
sometimes fortnightly, basis. Partly it is attributable to the style of event they host, with 
entertainment on a family friendly model, which makes the events feel less contentious. 
ESI experimented briefly with coordinating protest campaigns in England and Egypt 
simultaneously but decided to restrict their activities to the UK, partly to allay fears of 
repercussions for family members (Interview 13). Activists within the movement, both 
Egyptian and non-Egyptian, have noticed these issues and acted as brokers to overcome 
the challenges of decertification. 
Unlike in the broader historical sense decertification at this stage in the exile 
process does not rely on any actual input from external authorities. Activists have 
internalised perceptions of the regime’s danger and power (which in part motivated 
their original flight) and these are sufficient to ensure decertification continues to 
function and is in this sense self-reinforcing. 
Brokerage: A Counterbalance to Decertification 
Sympathetic British activists are as much a part of this story as Egyptians in exile. 
When motivation is low among Egyptians or security concerns are high there are 
influential allies there to persuade Egyptians into action or to mobilise on their behalf. 
Where decertification worked to convince Egyptians activism would either be futile or 
counter-productive, brokerage was set in motion by ‘political entrepreneurs’ who 
brought Egyptians into contact with their allies (Lewis and Mosse, 2006: 13). In order 
to observe the function of brokerage it is necessary to examine the exile SMOs and their 
actions in detail. Following the account of exiled activism I will offer the case of Justice 
for Giulio as a particularly compelling example of the mechanism. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood in England 
Both in organisational terms and in mobilisation capacity the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) have the most extensive apparatus in England. This is partly because their 
presence in England, and across Europe, has been established since their earlier 
proscribed periods in the 20th century. Before 2013 MB in England benefited from 
funding by the Gulf states but none the less lacked the self-confidence to organise under 
their own name preferring to mobilise through proxy organisations (Rich, 2010: 131; 
Whine, 2005: 35). After the 2013 coup the Brotherhood reportedly shifted their 
headquarters to north London to avoid persecution (The Times, May 15, 2015). Yet the 
move appears to have been abandoned or motivated by PR purposes (Channel 4 News, 
2015).  
Despite having taken up semi-official residence in London it is more meaningful 
to talk of the MB in England as an SMO rather than a party. That is to say that given the 
size of the MB in Egypt and abroad, in London as with other European capitals, the MB 
have substantial numbers of supporters and followers rather than members over whom 
the leadership could exert direct control (Interviews 2, 8, 10). So in London, the label 
SMO appropriately describes the range of more and less formal organisations that 
support the MB.  
The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), for example, is a respectable 
Muslim, civil society organisation in the UK that happens to be ‘dominated’ by 
supporters of the MB, to use the language of a UK government report (Jenkins and Farr, 
2015: 23).11 The MAB have worked with the UK government in combatting terrorism 
                                                 
11 The UK government in 2015 published redacted findings from a report into the ‘activities’ of 
the MB in the UK at the request of the Saudi government (The Times, November 5, 2015). 
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within the UK, for instance by assisting police in their operation to remove Abu Hamza 
from his central London mosque. Yet they share the goals and values of the MB, have 
been active in London mayoral elections (supporting Ken Livingstone and Sadiq Khan) 
and sending speakers and grassroots members to MB protests (Interview 16). MB 
supporters in London have an online presence primarily through Facebook pages, in 
particular R4BIA, British Egyptians for Democracy and Stop Sisi (Jenkins and Farr, 
2015: 26). The former is an ongoing campaign that protests regularly on the streets of 
London and provides an online forum for raising awareness of Brotherhood claims. 
Stop Sisi is a campaign that was established to mobilise protest on the streets of London 
to coincide with Sisi’s state visit to the UK.  
Characterising the Brotherhood’s ideology is complicated by internal debates 
(Naguib, 2009: 105). These in turn shed more light on the specific character of the 
organisation in London. The London leadership in late 2015 were embroiled in a power 
struggle with the new Egyptian leadership which had elected a radical spokesperson 
who had publicly condoned the use of violence in politics. London attempted to impose 
a moderate candidate for leader suggesting the commitment to democracy in England is 
strong (Mada Masr, 2015). As is well known the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is 
Islamist and their commitment to democracy has for most of their history been far from 
assured. Nonetheless their claims to democratic legitimacy have dominated their 
discourse in the west since the Raab’a massacre of 2013 in which the military 
dictatorship brutally killed thousands of their members and supporters. The Brotherhood 
pioneered the ‘secret cell’ structure that has characterised Islamist groups subsequently 
and therefore it is futile to attempt to put a figure to their English membership. 
Nonetheless it is clear to any observer who has spent time attending protests or events in 
London that of all the groups active in England it is the Brotherhood who command the 
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force of numbers (Underhill, 2016, 28-29). This is partly because unaffiliated Islamists 
are willing to lend their support to Brotherhood events (Interviews 6, 10). 
On the streets of London supporters of the MB have claimed a space for their 
protests outside of the Egyptian Embassy which they often march to from Marble Arch. 
Their protests reveal aspects of their discourse that attempts to state their democratic 
claims to power in Egypt while simultaneously affirming their identity as British 
Egyptians. For example, bearded Islamists have posed for photos on protest at the 
embassy atop ‘Boris Bikes’, civic bicycles introduced to London by former mayor Boris 
Johnson. Another claim making technique used by MB supporters is the use of 
protesting wearing the face of deposed MB president Morsi as a mask. 
Revolutionary Socialists of Egypt (RSE) 
The RSE are a Trotskyist political faction who have operated in Egypt since circa 2003. 
Similar to the MB some of their prominent and grassroots members have been political 
prisoners since the 2013 coup. Their numbers have always been smaller than those of 
the MB, the 2003 protests in solidarity with Palestine remained, until the 2011 
revolution, their primary period of recruitment (Ali, 2011). Despite organising in a 
manner reminiscent of formal political parties the RSE have refused to grant successive 
Egyptian dictatorships approval by participating in fraudulent elections and have opted 
instead to voice their political claims through extra-parliamentary yet nonviolent 
activism (El-Hamalawy, 2011). 
Since the coup those members of the RSE leadership who have evaded arrest 
have relocated to England where they have taken up roles as guest scholars at UK 
universities. From English exile they have continued their work of peaceful activism, 
yet unlike the Muslim Brothers the RSE have focussed on working with English 
activists and spreading their message through dialogue rather than protest (Interview 7). 
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Revolutionary Socialists have not maintained a presence outside the Egyptian embassy 
and were absent from anti-Sisi protests at Downing street (Interview 10, 15). The RSE 
have nurtured connections with British socialist organisations such as the Socialist 
Workers Party whose conference they have addressed three years running (Interview 7).  
Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI) 
When Egyptians in exile have shown reticence voicing their political claims, 
sympathetic allies have mobilised on their behalf, doing what they could to encourage 
exiled activism. Since 2014 The Egypt Solidarity Initiative (ESI) has developed a brand 
that is known within activist circles. A nimble and effective outfit, born of the UK trade 
union movement, ESI mobilises union resources around campaigns in solidarity with 
the repressed workers movement in Egypt. Nimble because, rather than develop a new 
organisation, when its organisers perceived a need for an Egypt specific campaign they 
launched the organisation as a campaign belonging to, and with access to resources 
belonging to, a previously established wing of trade unionism, the MENA solidarity 
network (Interview 14). Similar to other SMOs discussed in this paper ESI are able to 
operate with, in this case, union resources with comparatively low costs as they avoid 
the administration involved with a formal membership structure. Grassroots ESI 
activists are volunteers borrowed from trade union and student movements whose 
actions are directed (in a collective sense) by a permanent steering group (Interviews 
14, 15).  
Their effectiveness, a function of tactics, is evident in movement outcomes. ESI 
campaigns have reached a level of brand recognition such that on most campaign 
literature the ESI logo appears alongside the MENA solidarity logo in order to lend 
some prestige to the latter, although the two are in reality not distinct units (Interview 
13). The steering group officially includes names well known in UK politics from the 
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trade union movement such as the late Bob Crowe, John McDonnell and Jeremy 
Corbyn who were present at the founding meeting and lend their own prestige to the 
movement. Day to day however the group is staffed by a core of dedicated activists who 
have day jobs, are less well known to the UK public, and for varying reasons happen to 
have a particular interest in the Egyptian workers movement (Interviews 14, 15). 
ESI are open about their trade union funding sources which are listed on their 
website in order to avoid accusations of political subterfuge by Egyptian authorities. For 
the same reason (in addition to security fears) ESI restrict their activism to within the 
UK. Since 2014 they have staged a number of creative public protests in London 
designed to draw public attention to human rights violations and workers’ struggles in 
Egypt. An analogous tactic has been to piggy-back on larger protests, such as students 
marches and protests after Brexit in order to spread their message at street level. 
Their most ambitious, and probably most effective, actions have been two 
conferences on the topic of Arab counter-revolutions and the publication a quarterly 
journal, in the format of a glossy magazine. 
Non-partisan Activism 
Other activists in England prefer to lend their support to events rather than to any group 
or ideology. These people are the grassroots of the movement, which is something 
distinct from a political party in any case. Movements, more than parties, are fluid and 
share supporters between and across chapters. These activists are the real colour and 
emotion of the exile scene. There is, for example, an Egyptian singer living in London 
who in 2011 had performed on stage in Tahrir Square songs she had composed for the 
revolution. She left Egypt following the coup and now sings love songs in night clubs 
around England but also performs the songs of revolution at exile protests (Interview 9). 
Her songs are popular within the exile community, but probably more popular with 
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activist organisers who implicitly or explicitly understand that music can offer more 
selective incentives (the solution to Olsen’s collective action problem) than a noble 
cause can. 
Several alliances have been established between exiles and British activists. 
Several Labour MPs have devoted parliamentary and extra-parliamentary resources to 
working with the movement. John McDonnell is a long-term member of the ESI 
steering committee and along with Jeremy Corbyn have both appeared on ESI marches 
(Interview 14; Middle East Solidarity Autumn 2015: 22). Daniel Zeichner, discussed in 
more detail below, the Labour MP for Cambridge has worked with Amnesty and ESI on 
the campaign against police brutality in Egypt (Interview 13). Even the artist Banksy 
has worked with Egyptian exiles who worked on the Arab Spring themed artwork in his 
‘Dismaland’ exhibition (Interview 7; Mada Masr, September 27, 2015). 
Justice for Giulio 
We have already considered brief examples of brokerage at work in how SMOs dealt 
with the challenges of decertification. Take the campaign surrounding Giulio Regeini as 
illustrative of the process in more detail.12 Brokerage is at work whenever activists 
cooperate, and is of greater analytical significance whenever SMOs cooperate, the case 
of Regeini is an excellent example of SMOs cooperating with non-movement actors 
                                                 
12 An equally telling example is that of the protests surrounding president Sisi’s visit to 
Downing Street. These protests brought the full ideological spectrum of exiled activists onto 
the streets in common cause (as well as a bus of Sisi supporters) (The Times, November 5, 
2015; Middle East Solidarity, Spring 2016: 22). However, in the run up to the visit MB 
activists actually reached out to secular and socialist organisations to coordinate activities 
(Interviews 5, 10, 15; The Independent, June 18, 2015). 
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over a sustained campaign. Regeini was an Italian PhD student at Cambridge University 
researching independent trade union activity in post-revolution Egypt. He died in Egypt 
while on field work, his death bearing all the hallmarks of murder by the secret police. 
His body, found by the side of the road, bore the scars of torture. The case caused some 
outrage in the UK and Italy. For Egyptians torture and disappearance are common 
occurrences which invariably go unreported in the West. Regeini’s death brought the 
story home to UK news audience. A campaign called Justice for Giulio was set up by 
political entrepreneurs who brought Egyptian and English activists together. 
The campaign began when the MP for Cambridge, Daniel Zeichner, took 
ownership of the matter and contacted Amnesty International (Interviews 5, 13, 14). He 
proposed a partnership to raise the profile of the issue. Zeichner, on his own initiative, 
first handled the case as a constituency matter acting independently. He raised the issue 
in parliament working with opposition MPs to raise an early day motion calling on the 
government to investigate the causes of death. He met with staff at Cambridge 
University to review security and ethical procedures. He also met with Regeini’s parents 
at the European parliament.  However, Zeichner, worked with Amnesty to bring the 
power of activism to bear on the issue. Zeichner organised town hall meetings in 
Cambridge where the issue was important to students and residents. Meetings were 
addressed by Zeichner as well as representatives of Amnesty, ESI (on the invitation of 
Amnesty) and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) (Interview 12). The campaign 
spread as Amnesty produced campaign materials (placards, t-shirts, leaflets) which ESI 
took to the streets, campuses and conferences. ESI also used their magazine to report on 
and raise the profile of the issue.  
The case may have had more resonance for the wider British audience than it did 
for Egyptian exiles, who, while they sympathised with Regeini, also understood that 
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torture, disappearance and state killings are an ordinary part of life in Egypt. Brokerage 
kicked in when Zeichner performed the functions of a political entrepreneur, connecting 
previously unconnected groups, including but not restricted to Amnesty, ESI, and the 
NUJ, initiating a fresh wave of activism in so doing. This example is compelling 
because it illustrates how, by connecting diverse SMOs and allies around a single issue 
the mechanism fundamentally altered the character of the exile mobilizing structure 
both in terms of its network and its repertoire. 
Comparing Activism in Egypt and England 
The move from Egypt to England coincided with changes both in opportunities for 
activism and the forms it took. The convergence of institutional exclusion and 
repression in Egypt make the Egyptian polity appear ‘closed’ to activism, at least 
relative the stable English polity with its established division of powers, multi-layered 
representation and availability of political allies for activists. The repertoire of exile is 
more diverse than the Egyptian repertoire. Activists in England have found a home on 
campus and have directed much of their energy toward intellectual activities (research, 
conferences) that straddle the boundary between research and activism. The Egyptian 
end of the spectrum is fundamentally more radical as it contains riots, the English 
repertoire being more peaceful. 
The attention to the mechanics of exile in the case study however suggests that 
variation in opportunities and repertoire is more than simply the initial conditions giving 
way to subsequent conditions. Decertification and brokerage connect activism before 
and after exile as well as connecting exiled activism to other instances of contentious 
politics. Both mechanisms appear as historical constants yet exhibit variation at a micro-
sociological level entailing different outcomes. Prior to exile decertification was 
engineered by an authoritarian regime at an institutional level in an attempt to limit and 
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control political claim-making. After exile the input of an external authority became 
superfluous as the effects of political censorship became self-reinforcing through 
rumours and fears. Brokerage meanwhile, though present in inter-SMO cooperation in 
Egypt, took on an added dimension in England where allies of the movement as diverse 
as interested observers, trades unions and Members of Parliament acted to integrate 
exiles into the everyday political claim-making of the host country.  
Conclusion: The Mechanics of Exile 
When exiles left Egypt for England they left behind a culture of suspicion that expressly 
prohibited political engagement. Most if not all had been present in the Tahrir 
revolution, arguably the first iconic moment of democratic history in the 21st century, 
but arrived in England fatigued, unengaged and often scared. In the permissive political 
culture of cosmopolitan London their movement flourished, contrary to the implicit 
aims of the authoritarian regime whose unofficial policy of exile had initiated the 
process. Yet it did not have to turn out like this. Had exile operated as the military 
regime of Egypt had intended the movement would have burned out into apathy. As it 
transpired exile did change activism, but it did not put a stop to it. 
Analytically I have suggested that decertification and brokerage explain much of 
the mobilisation observed. Decertification has historical precedents that can be traced 
back to the establishment of the mass parties in mid 20th century Egypt. I have argued 
that after the act of exile has occurred, from the apparent safety of sanctuary abroad, 
decertification becomes, or is already, internalised to the movement. Historically 
external authorities were required to discourage activism, yet the act of exile is so 
traumatic that the need for external factors becomes replaced by rumour and fear in the 
new context abroad. Brokerage offers, in part, a way of breaking the decertification loop 
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as political entrepreneurs connect exiles with local allies who are motivated to create 
and exploit political opportunities. 
Herein lie the key findings of this study, reflecting the broader trend in social 
movement research to progress beyond traditional cause-effect explanations to unpack 
the mechanisms which bring about puzzling variations. Decertification and brokerage 
can be said to have general purchase given they have been observed in a wide variety of 
contexts prior to this research. Their relevance here is that they can be seen to amount to 
evidence that exile is a process rather than an event. Taken in aggregate they offer one 
explanation for why exiled activism takes the form it does, yet more profoundly, they 
demonstrate why exile may hinder yet not spell an end to political participation. That is 
not to say this explanation is exhaustive; I have not, due to restrictions, touched upon 
the discourse of exiled activism. Framing processes are a well-established aspect of 
social movement theory. Nonetheless this explanation may well, subject to further 
research, be shown to hold for the process of exile generally. The case selection and 
comparative case study design were intended to support this suggestion.  Exile should 
be considered one of the major processes of contentious politics, along with well 
established areas of investigation such as mobilisation, revolution and democratisation. 
The role of rumour and fear raise interesting questions for existing accounts of 
why and how mobilisation occurs more generally. Rumours, by definition 
unsubstantiated, challenge the notion that the decision to participate is based on rational 
calculation. In fact, the evidence in this paper raises the possibility that fears preventing 
participation may be in some senses irrational, based as they are on unsubstantiated 
claims. What matters more to whether mobilisation occurs, and in which forms, are 
historical processes and causal mechanisms. 
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